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ABSTRACT 
This paper suggests that understanding questions such as those related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) re- 
quires economic theorizing to include in its explanatory models the very fact that (economic) agents have their own 
distinctive conception of how reality ought to be (which implies making judgments of value). Under standard economic 
theorizing, the relationship between social or ethical values and economics is one of mere juxtaposition. Ethical and 
economic issues are being put together side by side in such a way that the anomalies pointed out by economics, which 
refer to the presence of goal paradoxes and the problem of altruism, etc., denote the presence of ethical issues within the 
processes of valuation and choice by agents. To surpass this relationship a change of perspective by means of the 
agents’ action plans approach is proposed. The action plan approach allows to pass from a conception of economics 
understood as a technology-of-choice to economics understood as a theory of production-of-action. In particular, it is 
shown that the ethical dynamics of agents are capable of generating “ethical novelties”, which consequently alter the 
agents’ space of goals. Insofar as this is heavily influenced by CSR, the consequence is that CSR is neither strange to 
Economics nor a concept juxtaposed with the analysis of autonomous economic processes. 
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1. Introduction 
As standard economic theorizing has increasingly be- 
come a technology of choice, there is virtually no room 
for the integration of Ethics and Economics. Moreover, 
we have argued elsewhere that under the image of Eco- 
nomics as a technology of choice, the relationship be- 
tween Ethics and Economics is one of mere juxtaposition 
[1]. Ethical and economic issues are being put together 
side by side in such a way that the anomalies pointed out 
by economics, which refer to the presence of goal para- 
doxes and the problem of altruism, etc., attest the pres- 
ence of ethical issues within the processes of valuation 
and choice by agents. Standard economic theorizing does 
not provide a sufficiently coherent analytical base for 
integrating behaviors based on non-utilitarian or non- 
consequentialist motivations. 
However, this is the context in which thematic fields 
such as “ethical formation and economic behavior”, “eco- 
nomy and social responsibility”, etc., are usually posed 
[2]. As a result, the ethical problems present in agents’ 
decisions, which owing to their very characteristics can- 
not be interpreted under the analytical focus of utilitari- 
anism or the strictest consequentialism, would remain 
void of non-trivial economic explanation inasmuch as 
they are outside the domain of standard economic theory. 
Economic rationality (the instrumental rationality in- 
herent to the economic domain) is distinguished from 
other types of rationality (e.g. ethical rationality) as a 
characteristic of other spheres of social life. In this con- 
text, the goals pursued by agents (individuals and or- 
ganizations), their evolution (which affects the connec- 
tions between goals), their hierarchy and content and the 
agents’ intentionality are not given sufficient considera- 
tion as dynamic elements of the economy. 
In this paper, it is suggested that understanding ques- 
tions such as those related to Corporate Social Responsi-
bility (CSR) requires economic theorizing to include in 
its explanatory models the very fact that (economic) 
agents have their own distinctive conception of how rea- 
lity ought to be (which implies making judgments of 
value). This generally goes beyond pure utilitarianism 
or consequentialism and determines the type of plans 
(strategies) they formulate and affects the decisions they 
undertake. This conception of what ought to be (which 
evolves as a result of the ethical dynamics of agents) can 
be seen in the definition, settlement and hierarchic struc- 
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ture of the goals agents pursue as individuals and as or- 
ganizations. These goals may be expressed in monetary 
terms (with a price) or are simply not susceptible to 
monetary expression. 
The approach proposed in this paper implies a change 
of perspective: from a conception of Economics under- 
stood as a technology-of-choice to Economics understood 
as a theory of production-of-action. Section 2 includes a 
brief summary of certain relevant common topics of CSR 
literature that exemplify the problematic relationship be- 
tween social responsibility and Economics. In Section 3, 
a conceptual view of the role and consequences of the 
agents’ pursuit of goals on the development of new ca- 
pabilities and new behavioral patterns, etc. is presented 
[3-6]. Accordingly, we introduce the concept of agents’ 
action plans. In particular, it will be shown that the ethi- 
cal dynamics of agents are capable of generating “ethical 
novelties”, which consequently alter the agents’ space of 
goals. Insofar as this is heavily influenced by CSR, the 
consequence is (and this is the main thesis of the paper) 
that CSR is neither strange to Economics nor a concept 
juxtaposed with the analysis of autonomous economic 
processes. In Section 4, we show how a more compre- 
hensive and systematic analysis of Economics and CSR 
can be developed: social responsibility is not an appendix 
or a mere technical expedient attached to economics, but 
rather an issue that refers naturally and necessarily to 
questions that may be answered from within an integra- 
tive approach, i.e. within a conception of Economics as a 
theory of production of action. The paper finishes with 
some concluding remarks. 
2. Economics, CSR and Choice 
There has recently been a significant increase in the con- 
cern about the ethical or non-ethical character of certain 
management models and business behaviors and their 
consequences. For example, in Spain sustainability re- 
ports have doubled since 2005. Moreover, according to a 
recent report by KPMG, 80% of the top companies in the 
world complete this procedure, as opposed to the 50% of 
three years ago [7]. Business forums, business schools 
and business journals insist on CSR and the ethical train- 
ing of their executives, managers and employees [8]. So- 
ciety supposedly requires modern companies and CEOs 
to provide more than maximum monetary efficiency in 
the management of resources [9]. 
Therefore, it is no longer sufficient to conceive corpo- 
rations as decision units that merely select from a variety 
of given alternatives those that offer the maximum 
monetary profit, but rather it is necessary to consider 
corporations as organizations within a social environ- 
ment for which they are also responsible. 
The general recognition of the role of CSR is beyond 
discussion [10]. This recognition has given rise to a good 
number (and variety) of debates: for example, on the 
determination of the limits to CSR, the supply and de- 
mand of investments in socially responsible activities 
[11], etc. There have also been a variety of responses. 
Nevertheless, as a result of these debates, the existence of 
a problematic relationship between the economic and 
ethical-CSR discourses has been confirmed. Thus, CSR 
is introduced into the economic discourse in terms of the 
direct economic costs (more or less broad altruistic pro- 
grams, internal or external to the company, which streng- 
then the corporation image) or indirect costs (defined as 
opportunity costs of the corresponding programs) com- 
panies have to assume.  
Beside shareholders and stockholders, the old areas of 
concern for the entrepreneur are stakeholders (employees, 
shareholders, suppliers, clients, trade unions, institutions, 
universities, mass media, etc.) as agents to which the 
modern corporation is responsible. Moreover, companies 
are “forced” to add the socioeconomic and environmental 
element (clean and loyal production and commercial pra- 
ctices, corporation’s co-responsibility regarding sustain- 
able development) to this human group as facets a re- 
sponsible corporation also has to take into consideration. 
(For example, the 2nd point of the European Commission 
Green Paper on CSR points out that CSR consists of “a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and envi- 
ronmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with the stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis” [12]). Do they total too many burdens for a com- 
pany? If we accept that a company has to be responsible, 
how can the extension and density -where applicable- of 
the company’s social responsibility be determined? The 
solution to this problem does not seem easy on a purely 
economic scale because it is not a merely utilitarian 
problem but also one of ethical behaviors.  
In the literature on Ethics and Economics, multiple 
incompatibilities of actions described by standard eco- 
nomic theory appear as inherent to the representative 
economic agent in relation to many real actions (not only 
mainly economic) of people and organizations, thus giv- 
ing rise to the literature of the casuistry of “the irrational” 
(altruistic actions, social responsibility, conflicts of in- 
terest, indecisions, etc.). Sen [13] is a classical reference 
on the internal inconsistency of preferences when re- 
vealing the choices made by the agent as the only way to 
accommodate “the anomalous” choices made by the 
agent on an analytical scale.  
From a technical point of view, it is correct to affirm 
that any additional ethical consideration other than mere 
personal interest (e.g. altruism, motivations, etc.) would 
generate “irrational” choices or “anomalies” of problem- 
atic accommodation within the framework of standard 
economics [14]. The generalized use of utility as a con- 
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cept that includes virtually everything agents want to 
value and the assumption that it is only valuable if it 
supposes an achievement have lead to the identification 
within a very widespread conception of economic theory 
of what is good for the agent (individual or organization) 
with all that reports positive achievements in terms of 
individual well-being, regardless of the value of the ac- 
tion itself [15]. The moral of achievement, based on a lax 
meaning of utility, has then been made compatible with 
the use of a concept of economic rationality identified 
with maximum self-interest or the principle of systematic 
egoism.  
This kind of reasoning has led to the identification of 
standard economic theory as a technology of choice [16] 
in which the units of decision choose from a variety of 
given alternatives in an a-temporal context and use the 
maximization criteria of a subjective indicator of satis- 
faction susceptible to quantification (utility linked to con- 
sumption, pecuniary profits, etc.), which makes it possi-
ble to determine “quantitatively” how much of a goal is 
being achieved. The framework of standard economics is 
a-temporal: economic models (such as Walrasian models) 
are settled in a framework of logic, not historic time, 
leaving no room for substantial dynamic phenomena like 
expectations, money, innovation processes, institutional 
change and so forth [17]. 
From this viewpoint, the integration between ethics 
and economics is particularly problematic. In fact, under 
the technology-of-choice approach, the existing relation- 
ship between ethics and economics is one of mere juxta-
position: Ethics and Economics are put together in such a 
way that the anomalies indicated by the standard eco- 
nomic theory only serve to point out the presence of ex- 
tra-economic ethical issues in the processes of valuation 
and choice of the agents. For example, although both 
common sense and empirical evidence suggest the con- 
trary, the model of people as purely self-interest beings 
dominates management-related theories [18].  
Despite the need to surpass these limitations by taking 
into account, for example, the ethical elements present in 
the strategic decisions or to integrate socially responsible 
behavior into a more general strategy for the company 
[19] that maximizes the long-term value [20], there is no 
sufficiently coherent analytical base in standard econom- 
ics for integrating behaviors that differ from those based 
on egoistic or consequentialist motivations. As a cones- 
quence, there is no room for explaining CSR or its exten- 
sion or density. The “socially responsible” is seen as an 
additional restriction, a remora, which is imposed over 
the natural logic of economic processes [21]. If business 
ethics is conceived as a set of impositions and constraints, 
rather than motivating force of business behavior [22] the 
responsible entrepreneur will be responsible because he 
is called to philanthropy, regardless of what a “rational” 
or “economic” judgment dictates to him.  
Nevertheless, most of these problems have to do with 
the meaning that is attributed to Economics. The preci- 
sion of what is usually understood by Economics (by 
economic theory in particular) is a condition of possibi- 
lity for progressing substantively in the intent to integrate 
ethics, economics and CSR. The understanding of ques- 
tions as the role performed by ethics—and, therefore, 
CSR requires economics to incorporate into its explana- 
tory models the irrefutable fact that agents have certain 
conceptions of ought to be (and in this technical sense, 
we will speak of ethics) that are idiosyncratic to them 
(that is, in this approach we give “ethics” a purely tech- 
nical sense, which does not imply in itself any kind of 
moral relativism, but rather the qualification of a type of 
judgment), which determines the decisions they take. To 
explore the role played by individual ethical dynamics in 
economic processes, it will be necessary to go one step 
further: what is needed is to investigate the accurate 
meaning of what is “economic”, i.e. of the object of 
study of economic theory. The concept of agent action 
plans will be extremely useful for this purpose.  
3. Agents Action Plans and Economic  
Dynamics 
3.1. Agents Action Plans 
By human rational action, it is meant that action is 
formed and deployed according to reason; otherwise, the 
agents’ action is essentially planned, i.e. according to 
plans of action. In order to analyze an agent’s real action 
as an indissoluble and dynamic whole, an examination of 
the analytical structure of agency action from the “action 
plan” framework is proposed. The concept of action plan 
is not new in economics. It can be found in the work of 
economists of very different traditions, such as Keynes 
[23], Hicks [24], Debreu [25], Boulding [26], Lachman 
[27], Metcalfe [28], etc. 
To shed light on a wide range of complex phenomena, 
the action plan is proposed as a suitable unit of selection. 
The “action plan approach” is a theoretical framework 
that connects micro- and meso-analytical levels [29] by 
allowing the consideration of the role of goals and inten- 
tionality in the explanation of action [30,31] (obviously 
not all human—individual or organizational—is necessa- 
rily planned. However, it is this characteristic note of 
human action why action is rationally intelligible). 
From this standpoint, economic dynamics may be un- 
derstood in a complementary way to that previously ex- 
posed as the process of generation, adoption and an at- 
tempted interactive deployment of the agents’ plans of 
action and the resulting products [32]. An action plan is 
the agent’s projective linkage of means to goals (or ends). 
The very nature of action plans is the projective character 
Copyright © 2012 SciRes.                                                                                  ME 
F.-F. MUÑOZ  ET  AL. 358 
of the ordering involved. At each instant of time, an ac- 
tion plan may be interpreted as a template, blueprint or 
guide for action that projectively connects elements of a 
different nature: something the agent wants to achieve 
(goals or purposes) with the means the agent “knows” 
afford him success.  
The action plans individuals elaborate are characteris- 
tic to them. Take, for example, an individual’s plan for a 
trip. They can also be plans that articulate the action and 
coordinate the goals of groups of people (all types of 
organizations and societies). Take, for example, a fam- 
ily’s plan of a trip, a company’s business plan, a plan of 
the European Commission to reach the objectives of 
Lisbon, a country’s development plan, etc.  
An action plan is a system of connections whose ele- 
ments are linked in a special manner; it is the projective 
ordering of means to achieve ends located in the imag- 
ined future. This concept shows the direction of action: 
agents (individuals or organizations) determine their goals 
and their connection with means and project the se-
quence for achieving them. Accordingly, they need to 
order their actions (according to their knowledge, ex- 
perience, perceptions, creativity, beliefs and entrepre- 
neurship, etc.) in order to achieve purposeful goals. An 
action plan is a rather general open structure; it can in- 
clude routine patterns of behavior, strategic designs and 
monitoring and valuation procedures, etc.  
A plan can also refer to its goals at several points in 
the future, represent hierarchical dependencies between 
goals and actions with as many analytical moments in 
time as may be required, as well as alignments of goals 
with other individuals’ plans (e.g. as complex as desired). 
Its projective character refers not only to the fact that 
historic time (and timing) play central roles in explaining 
human action, but also that actions and goals need to be 
imagined before they are deployed by agents. Imagina- 
tion plays a central role in this approach. As Loasby [33] 
states, “imagination always operates by making new 
connections, thereby creating new structures: imagina- 
tion creates order. There seem to be three motives for 
doing so: as a direct challenge to an existing order, as a 
response to a breakdown of order, and as an attempt to 
colonize a terra incognita.” 
These sets of means and goals (the elements of the 
system “action plan”) can be manifold. The set of actions 
and goals linked projectively by means of an action plan 
may contain different kinds of elements: material or im- 
material elements localized at different moments in time 
(obviously, not all at the same time); elements with a 
monetary price (in official currency) or without a mone- 
tary price (a subjective level of satisfaction of a need); 
etc. Action plans are an analytical open representation of 
projective agency action because means and goals are not 
given a priori, but rather produced by the agents them- 
selves. These analytical constructions enable the depic- 
tion of any kind of action plan (such as a planned trip, a 
business plan, a strategic plan, a CEC plan to implement 
the objectives of the Lisbon agenda, etc.) with structures 
of hierarchical dependence between goals and with as 
many analytical periods of time as necessary (properties 
and representations of the structure of action plans using 
simple graphs can be found in [34]).  
Plans are pervasive and the importance of action plans 
for economic theorizing is not new. Agencies (individu- 
als and organizations) make plans and planning (an ac-
tivity in itself) implies making connections. 
3.2. Some Examples 
In order to have a more accurate idea of the meaning of 
an action plan, the following figure shows an open rep- 
resentation of one of these plans. 
Figure 1 represents an action plan of an agent (an in- 
dividual, a group or an organization) at instant t. The 
plan depicted here consists of executing actions a1, a2 
and a3 at instant t; executing a4 and a5 in order to reach 
goal g1 at the next (analytical) instant (t + 1); and finally 
reach goals g2, g3 and g4 in (t + 2). The underlined ac- 
tions and goals (a1, a5, g1 and g2) represent actions and 
goals “with a price” (for example, actions such as pur- 
chasing and selling, which have a monetary revenue, etc.; 
and goals such as reaching a rate of return, a level of 
sales, etc.); while the non-underlined actions and goals 
(a2, a3, a4, g3 and g4) are actions and goals “without price” 
(thinking, “do nothing”, etc.); and goals such as learning 
something, protecting the natural environment, etc.  
This type of representation can be adapted to contain 
any kind of action plan. Thus, for example, the same 
graphs may be used to introduce elements related to CSR. 
Let us suppose that the represented plan consists of the 
set of actions and goals of a financial firm that awards 
microcredit. The financial firm begins by: raising funds 
(a1); reuniting a group of people who wish to set up in 
business and have no access to formal credit (a2); and 
providing them with the required knowledge and capa- 
bilities (a3) at instant t in order to achieve the goal (g1) at 
t + 1, i.e. acquiring the means necessary to carry out the 
productive activity in question, so that, thanks to the fi-
nancial support and financial services contributed by the  
 












Figure 1. Representation of an action plan (see [35]). 
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financial organization (a5) the selected group of people 
enrolled in the project (a4) are able to reach a level of 
income (g2) at instant t + 2 to enable the independent 
personal and social development of the people, who re- 
ceive the financial support (g3), thus break one of the 
worst vicious circles of poverty (g4).  
At this point the reader may ask the following ques-
tions: if Economics refers to all this, what do the charac-
teristic purpose of economics as a reality and that of 
economic theory as a science comprise? If the conception 
of “the economic” characteristic of economic theory is 
what is proposed above (a theory of human action and its 
products), may we claim that contemporary economic 
theory is pure economicism? However, a meaning of 
what is “economic” would be economicism if it implied 
that the elements “with a price” in action plans had pre- 
eminence over all the other elements in the said plans; 
otherwise, it would imply that all the elements consid-
ered in action plans were “economic” in the popular 
sense of elements “with a price”. In our argument, the 
meaning of what is “economic” does not involve or im-
ply any such thing; although, as is evident, it would not 
exclude it if it were the case.  
However, the current meaning attributed to what is 
“economic” refers to a1, a5, g1 and g2, i.e. to the elements 
“with a price”, but not to the others. Nevertheless, within 
the approach proposed here, the whole structure of plans, 
and, therefore, all their constitutive elements are “eco- 
nomic” in the sense we attribute to economic theory here 
(further explained below). It should be noted that, despite 
this fact, it would not be possible to isolate the elements 
a1, a5, g1 and g2 from the rest without considering their 
role in the context of the action plan. 
3.3. Technology of Choice & Production of  
Action 
Speaking about plans (based on the analytical openness 
of both means and goals of action) implies the definitive 
abandonment of the timeless framework of the “techno- 
logy of choice”. The paradox of a timeless approach as 
an analytical basis for the explanation of processes that 
are necessarily deployed in time is solved through the dy- 
namic openness of the actions and goals pursued by 
agents. Robbins’ [36] definition of economics is essen- 
tially correct, but it is not sufficient. 
Within the action plan approach, agents’ rationality 
depends on the goals and motivations they pursue. What 
directs economic activity is not only economic calculus, 
but also the possibility of developing a true open ration- 
ality, the rationality of the unexpected in a context of 
radical uncertainty [37]. 
The concept of action plan allows us to move from a 
conception of economics as a technology of choice to 
economics as a theory of production of action (the latter 
becomes a condition of possibility for implementing a 
more substantive approach to “economics and CSR” is- 
sues. Indeed, economic theory is a particular approach to 
the study of rational human action in general, where the 
specificity is not in its object of study (the human action 
in general), but rather in the research method (and that 
consists of rationally studying the causal structures that 
link together the “adopted action plans” and the individ- 
ual and collective “results produced” by the interaction 
of these plans. Planning itself is not economic action; 
planning is a part of action—it is in fact an activity. It is 
the interactive deployment of these plans drawn up by 
agents and partly configures the economic (and social) 
general dynamics. 
Of course, not all human action is planned. The total 
action of a person (his/her real action) is made up of two 
elements: planned action and unplanned action. Planned 
action is not unimportant, residual or trivial; nor is it 
closed to rational knowledge. Feelings, emotions, in- 
stincts, beliefs, etc. play a very important real role in a 
person’s action. However, what deserves our attention as 
economists is that part of the action that is the result of 
deliberation [38]. Nevertheless, and despite being a part 
of the total action, the planned action introduces a series 
of fundamental dynamic elements that help us apprehend, 
among other things, the dynamical role of the intention- 
ality in action. 
4. Economics, Ethics, and CSR: Towards an  
Integrated Approach 
4.1. Economics and Ethics 
The concept of action plan incorporates a series of ele- 
ments that are extremely important for explaining ra- 
tional human action. Let us consider two fundamental 
elements: the goals of action and the projective character 
of action. Agents choose their action goals after taking 
into account a multitude of factors: psychological, social, 
cultural, ethical, etc. These plans are constituted using 
the imagination, considering that the goals pursued are 
located in a future that is imagined by the agent. 
It can be said that agents invent the future towards 
which they want to focus their actions [39]. This idea is 
valid when a goal in the very near future or in the me- 
dium or long term is considered. The opportunities for 
acting in a certain way (e.g. entrepreneurial) are not hid- 
den in some place of the reality waiting to be discovered 
by entrepreneurs or visionary individuals, but initially 
they are in the imagination of the agents (regardless of 
whether or not these opportunities later acquire the mate- 
riality of a written document, etc.). In the business world, 
this projective activity is especially evident in business 
strategy formulation and selection processes. 
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The connections between means and goals depend 
logically on what the agents know or think they know, i.e. 
on cognitive dynamics. Cognitive dynamics refer to the 
understanding agents (individuals or organizations) have 
of reality, where their understanding is condensed into 
representation systems created by the agents themselves 
(based not only on the traffic of scientific and technical 
representations, but also on beliefs the agents have on 
what the reality is, as well as the evolution of their un- 
derstanding). However, action plans materialize on the 
basis of the objectives, on the goals the agents want to 
reach. These goals are, in fact, those that guide action 
and furnish it with sense. We are therefore in a position 
to make an analytical distinction between the agents’ 
perception of what reality is or could be in the future (the 
agents’ cognitive dynamics) and their conception of what 
the reality ought to be, i.e. their ethical dynamics.  
Both dynamics, along with the cultural dynamics of 
the society in which agents carry out their activities, 
modify the content and forms of the agents’ action plans 
and, consequently, generate new realities. These realities 
contrast what agents previously conjecture in their action 
plans (ex ante) and what they agents (ex post) understand 
as actually happened. The imbalances between the 
courses of action and the anticipated results of action and 
what finally actually happens activate revision mecha- 
nisms (learning processes) regarding the agents’ plans as 
well as the way they (re)formulate their plans. As a con- 
sequence of this feedback, economic processes are com- 
plex processes. 
It is important to emphasize here that if one agent (or 
several agents) change (modify, alter, adapt, etc.) their 
goals (goals themselves and/or their hierarchic disposi- 
tion), it implies first of all that the content and form 
(structure) of their plans are modified and, secondly, that 
the interactive deployment of the new plans generates 
new realities. In fact, the introduction of new goals [40] 
does not only alter the agents’ spaces of objectives but 
also induce new types of actions and capabilities.  
It is also fundamental to determine that the concept of 
ethical dynamics referred here does not have any aprior- 
istic content in the sense that it does not imply any type 
of previous judgment about what is “good” or “bad”. The 
concept of ethical dynamics here simply recognizes that 
the agents act by projecting their action and, mainly, 
choosing their goals on the basis of their conception of 
how things ought to be.  
The purpose of Economic Theory is not to value the 
goodness or badness of certain behaviors, change proc- 
esses or the novelties that arise; this is the domain of 
Ethics. However, Economics does consider what the 
agents conceive as ought to be (and not only what they 
understand as is) because this determines decisively how 
agents form and select their action plans and, therefore, 
the actions they will take to achieve their goals and the 
consequences they have for the physical and natural 
world and the human and socio-cultural domain. And this 
points out the exact location of the element of connection 
between the ethical and economic domains. Economic 
action presupposes Ethics; however, economic actions do 
not prescribe ethical contents.  
To move over from a conception of economics under- 
stood as technology-of-choice to economics as theory of 
production-of-action helps us recognize the decisive role 
of ethical dynamics in the explanation of the characteris- 
tic purpose of the analysis of Economic Theory (ex- 
plaining why agents choose certain courses of action and 
not others, and the consequences of the interactive de- 
ployment of the said courses of action within the social 
milieu), as well as its eventual integration within the 
economic domain. Only in this way is it possible to over- 
come the mere juxtaposition between Ethics and Eco- 
nomics and the questions related to businesses ethics.  
4.2. CSR and Economics 
Let us now briefly examine the relationship between 
Economics and CSR from the point of view proposed 
here. Economic agents (individuals or organizations) not 
only differ from each other in their knowledge and capa- 
bilities but can also be distinguished by the goals to 
which they aspire. For example, with quite similar capa- 
bilities, different individuals or organizations may have 
very different aspirations. It is not our intention here to 
examine whether the particular prescriptive content of 
the goals each agent pursues is good or bad. The point 
here is to indicate that the content of the agents’ goals 
also has an ethical origin. This specific content is an es- 
sential constituent part of the agents’ action, and it can- 
not be explained as a mere result of knowledge and 
learning processes, but is direct and intimately tied to the 
conceptions of those agents and their ethical formation. 
The “socially responsible” entrepreneur is not less ra- 
tional than the entrepreneur who only maximizes eco- 
nomic profit. In a sense, both of them are maximize and 
rational. The difference between them is not the behav- 
ioral rule they observe or if one of them acts economi- 
cally and the other does not. Both types of entrepreneurs 
set the formal achievement of a goal that is also hierar- 
chically superior to their other goals and for that reason, 
this goal acts as the norm of their own action plans. Both 
types of entrepreneurs define their action plans by setting 
the goal (for an individual or a group) they want: they 
want to produce that goal. Thus, both types of agents are 
equally rational in that sense. 
A common statement in standard economics is that 
business efficiency is measured by a definition of the 
excess of revenues over expenses. Regardless of the truth 
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or falseness of such a claim, this statement requires, 
among other conditions, agents to have previously ele- 
vated the attainment of the maximum amount of money 
into the hierarchically dominant goal of business. Were 
this not the case, if the hierarchically dominant goal were 
not the attainment of the maximum amount of money, 
the place of that goal would necessarily be taken up by a 
different goal, which is perfectly rational according to 
what has been said above in this paper. 
The difference between an entrepreneur that maxi- 
mizes his/her profits and his/her socially responsible 
counterpart would lie in the specific prescriptive content 
of the hierarchically superior goals in their respective 
action plans. For the former, it would be the maximum 
difference between his/her revenues and their costs; for 
the latter, it would be a socially responsible aim. They 
are the agents (individuals or organizations) who decide 
their goals of action and the place they have in their ac- 
tion plans regardless of their goals or actions with or 
without price. The fact that certain goals or actions (and 
no others) were (or were not) considered in their action 
plans is explained by each agent’s ethical conceptions, i.e. 
by his/her own ethical dynamics. 
Thus, moving from a conception of economics as 
technology of choice to a conception of economics as 
production of action reveals the decisive role of ethical 
dynamics, entrepreneurship and CSR in the explanation 
of economic processes. The entrepreneur’s most impor- 
tant role is the production of new courses of action, i.e. 
producing new economic situations. This is the very na- 
ture of entrepreneurship in the context of a theory of pro- 
duction-of-action: entrepreneurship requires a focus on a 
transforming goal. This focus involves learning processes 
but it can also imply the emergence of completely new 
intentions and actions that are not explained solely by 
mere knowledge acquisition processes. 
Take, for instance, the interesting case of Grameen 
Bank. This bank has reversed conventional banking prac- 
tice by removing the need for collateral and it has created 
a banking system based on mutual trust, accountability, 
participation and creativity. Muhammad Yunus, the foun- 
der of Grameen Bank considered that financial resources 
ought to be made available to the poor under terms and 
conditions that are both appropriate and reasonable. 
Those ideas were at the origins of the micro-credit sys-
tem and they modify the contents and forms of the spaces 
of agents’ action and, consequently, generate new reali-
ties [41].  
From the production of action point of view, it is easy 
to see why the socially responsible entrepreneur is ra- 
tional: human action, qua rational, within human con- 
straints is intended action: there must be goals (reasons) 
for acting. As any other agents in the economy, entre- 
preneurs decide what their goals of action are (and what 
they are not) and which place they should be given in 
their action plans regardless of whether or not their goals 
or actions are attached to a price. 
Finally, the role of CSR in the global dynamics of the 
economically represented society is indicated by the 
types of actions deployed in interaction by the members 
of society, but mainly by the goals inserted within the 
agents’ action plans. What makes something be consid- 
ered good or bad, etc. is not the content of the prescript- 
tions, but the personal practical decision processes: ethics 
is internalized in human action, although other sources of 
norms would exist.  
The entrepreneur will be socially responsible if his ac- 
tion plans place special importance on “ethical” goals. 
Figure 2 offers a graphic summary of this idea. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
CSR may be introduced for a variety of reasons; even as 
a result of a purely strategic or egoistic calculation [20]. 
But it may also respond to other motivations: it may be a 
consequence of a legal imposition or a consequence of 
pressure from certain social groups, which implies the 
threat of a legal or social penalty, or as a result of con- 
version (e.g. companies in the non-profit sector). In any 
case, this will be seen in the role played by the socially 
responsible goals in the hierarchy of goals of a person or 
organization and in the density and intensity of the social 
traffic of this type of goal. Furthermore, it will show it- 
self in the type of plans or courses of action these agents 
undertake in interaction with others, giving rise to spe- 
cific effects. 
There is nothing in the nature of economic affairs that 
presupposes that elements with a price have an invariant 
natural autonomy, i.e. that the said elements follow a 
logic (a rationality) on their own and regardless of the 
other spheres that make up human action in society. If 
this were really so, we would again be in the presence of 
a relationship of mere juxtaposition between Ethics and 















analytical role for SCR  
Figure 2. Relationship between different conceptions of eth- 
ics and economics. 
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integrated with Economics and where the only role 
played by CSR and the ethical training of managers, em- 
ployees and entrepreneurs, etc. would be to mitigate the 
undesired consequences of the said autonomous eco- 
nomic processes. A change of focus on the conception of 
Economics such as the one proposed in this paper proves 
that this is not necessarily the case. The fact that the spe- 
cific content of goals (whatever it may be), which de- 
pends on individuals’ beliefs, knowledge and intentiona- 
lity, etc., may produce its effects through the actions of 
the individuals themselves also implies the possibility of 
a more integrated relationship between Ethics, Econom- 
ics and CSR. 
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